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Chapter 17 
Economic Reform and Privatization in Egypt 
Karen Pfeifer 
Egypt’s economic history from the abdication of King Farouk in 1952 to the abdication of Husni 
Mubarak in 2011 can be divided into three grand stages: the era of state-led development, the 
gradual erosion of state-led development, and the blossoming of neoliberalism. The period from 
2008 to the present (July 2011), that is, from global financial crisis and recession to fragile 
recovery, may be a fourth stage—entailing at least the erosion of neoliberalism and, perhaps, the 




The era of state-led development, from the 1950s to the 1970s, was characterized by an enlarged 
role for government in the economy, with public investment in physical infrastructure, industrial 
production, agrarian reform, and human development. (See Figure 17.1 showing Egypt’s score 
on the Human Development Index in comparison with the Arab countries as a group and the 
world as a whole.) This process was accompanied by fundamental changes in society and the 
class structure. The role of foreign capital was circumscribed, while domestic private capital was 
subordinated and confined to the interstices of state-run institutions and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). The landlord class was shrunk by land reform and a commercialized peasantry and rural 
working class cultivated in its place. With the expansion of ostensibly universal public 
education, including at the college level, a growing middle class of urban professionals and civil 
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servants arose, including women in the ranks of the college-educated and paid labor force. The 
urban working class burgeoned, in industry, services, public-sector firms and agencies. The state 
recognized the contributions of the professional and working classes and their right to form 
syndicates and unions, but controlled both the leadership and the finances of these institutions 
from the top, forbidding job actions such as strikes. A social compact prevailed in which the state 
provided legal protection for workers’ wages, benefits, and job security, as well as universal 
access to public services, welfare, and subsidies for basic necessities, in exchange for political 
quiescence and devotion to a common project of nation-building. 
[Figure 1.17 HDI Index, here] 
 The institutional fabric of state-led development gradually eroded over the 1970s and 
1980s, due to both external pressures and internal contradictions. The two wars with Israel, in 
1967 and 1973, were exorbitantly expensive for a low-income country and closed the Suez Canal 
for some years. The collapse of oil prices in the 1980s led to stagnation in neighboring countries 
where Egyptian migrant laborers worked. The heavy hand of central planning became 
overbearing and unwieldy. The complex agenda imposed on SOEs and other public-sector 
employers, including the absorption of all high school and college graduates, eventually rendered 
many SOEs inefficient and economically unviable. The conflict between, on one hand, 
supporting peasant agriculture to raise rural incomes and, on the other hand, requisitioning key 
commercial crops at low prices to feed the urban population and to sell for hard currency grew so 
severe that it drove peasants into producing unregulated, but socially less rational, crops such as 
clover to feed cattle. The educated middle class began asserting demands for civil liberties and 
respect for human rights. When economic problems worsened and opposition arose, top-down 
authoritarianism turned brutal and repressive, in particular toward the organized working class 
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and left-leaning political formations. Finally, the purchase of essential imports, such as inputs for 
industry and food to replace what was no longer produced domestically, was made increasingly 
difficult by the slow growth of exports, and this led to rising government deficits and 
international debt.  
 
Erosion of State-Led Development 
In response to emerging economic constraints, the regime of Anwar al-Sadat turned to the policy 
of infitah, or opening to foreign capital. While a private domestic capitalist class remained in the 
shadow of the state, the infitah helped to create a new wealthy comprador class, serving as the 
local agents for import/export companies and as representatives and junior partners of foreign 
capital. Following Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel in 1979, the United States became Egypt’s 
largest trading partner, source of foreign investment and aid donor.  
But the effort to curry favor with foreign capital was made without giving up the core 
role of the state and without major structural change in the Egyptian economy. The state 
economic enterprises, social contract with labor, and other promises of the Nasser era were left 
intact, and queues lengthened for public-sector jobs as the growth of the public sector slowed. 
This system was sustainable only as long as inflows of foreign currency continued apace—from 
aid, oil exports, foreign direct investment (mostly into the oil sector), Suez Canal tolls, 
international tourism, remittances from émigré workers, and a buildup of public debt to foreign 
lenders. 
As oil prices and oil revenues declined in the mid-to-late 1980s, the internal 
contradictions of state-led development and the region’s dependence on declining oil revenues 
and labor remittances came together to generate a crisis. The state’s industrialization strategy had 
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relied on importing Western technology wholesale in large chunks of capital-intensive 
investment. This meant that growth in the early decades had been based on additions to capital 
and labor, with little technological innovation or long-term expansion in the demand for 
industrial labor. The combination of stagnation in agriculture and industry led to rising 
unemployment, rapid rural-urban migration, and expansion of the informal sector. Furthermore, 
in contrast to the East Asian model—Egypt is often compared unflatteringly to South Korea— 
protection for domestic industry had been allowed to go on for too long, with little expectation 
that these firms would “pay back” state support with innovation that would make their products 
competitive in world markets and earn their own share of foreign exchange.
1
 And, finally, the 
promise of jobs in the public sector for all graduates, and the job protections that formal sector 
labor had won as part of the state-led social compact, led to overstaffing, wasted time, and 
resources, and declines in real compensation as inflation overtook nominal wage growth. 
Consequently, Egypt’s economic growth, national saving and public spending all 
plummeted in the later 1980s. Real per capita GDP growth fell from an average 4.7 percent per 
year during the 1980-1985 period to 0.3 percent per year from 1985 to 1990, and public spending 
was reduced steadily from its peak of 55 percent of GDP in 1985 to a low of 26 percent in the 
year 2000.
2
 This combination of internal crisis and the new reality of declining oil revenues and 
remittances made the Egyptian state more vulnerable to political influence from the emboldened 
class of importers and financiers who had flourished under the infitah and more susceptible to 
pressure from the international financial institutions (IFIs).  
                                                 
1
 See John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, 
Mexico, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 235; and World Bank, World Development 
Report 1995, pp. 103-108. 
2
Hossein Askari, Middle East Oil Exporters: What Happened to Economic Development? (Northampton, MA: 




Advent of Neoliberalism 
 
International financial institutions, in particular the World Bank and IMF, were able to 
introduce neoliberal ideas (“the Washington Consensus”) to Egypt through the role they played 
in tackling Egypt’s debt crisis. Structural adjustment programs required shrinking the role of the 
state, first through “stabilization” measures to cut government spending, reduce public deficits, 
and curb inflation, then through “liberalization” measures to reduce subsidies, remove price 
controls, and lower tariffs, and finally through “privatization” measures to sell off public-sector 
enterprises. Without cushioning the blows, all of these measures would create a fair amount of 
pain for working- and middle-class families and lead to strikes and protests. 
Prior to 1990, neoliberal reforms had not made much headway in Egypt due to resistance 
from organized labor and the possibility of escape for émigré workers. In reward for 
participating in the 1991 war to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, however, Egypt received a 
record amount of aid, $4.8 billion, in 1990-1991, of which $3 billion came from the Gulf oil 
exporters. In addition, international creditors canceled $13 billion of Egypt’s international debt. 
This financial relief facilitated the regime’s agreement to an IMF-led structural adjustment 
program that would not cause immediate pain to the citizenry or generate strong opposition.
3
 
The crisis years of the later 1980s and early 1990s had been a period of increasing 
poverty for Egypt. Yet in the early 2000s, income inequality and poverty measurements showed 
a less dire situation than simple per capita measures of economic growth suggested, indicating 
                                                 
3
 Joel Beinin 2002, “Late Capitalism and the Reformation of the Working Classes in the Middle East,” 
Chapter 7 in Israel Gershoni, Hakan Erdem, and Ursula Woköck, eds, Histories of the Modern Middle 
East: New Directions, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 116-117 
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that some institutions must have been providing significant income and consumption support to 
the poor.
4
 As the state’s role was shrunk under the “stabilization” program, these functions had 




As Egypt reduced the ratio of government spending to GDP by half from 1985 to 2004, 
public sector employment declined from 39 to 30 percent of the labor force. As the government 
liquidated holdings in 189 of 314 state economic enterprises, employment in that sector was 
halved, from 1.08 million employees (about 6 percent of the labor force) to less than a half-
million.
6
 At first, this appeared to validate the success of the privatization program, as the official 
unemployment rate fell from 11.7 to 8.3 percent and employment in the formal private sector 
rose 6 percentage points to 27 percent. By 2006, however, it was clear that it had been the 
informal sector, rather than the private formal sector, that had expanded the most, absorbing 75 
percent of new labor force entrants, accounting for 61 percent of actual employment, and 
producing between one third and one half of officially measured GDP.
7
 The safety valve of labor 
emigration was as important as ever: In 2005-2006, 2.3 million Egyptians worked abroad, and 
their remittances rose from an average of $3 billion from 2000 to 2003 to more than $5 billion in 
2004 and 2005, as indicated in Figure 17.3 below. 
                                                 
4
 As of 2000-2002, Egypt’s Gini index for consumption was 0.34, and Egypt’s Human Poverty Index 
(HPI-1) value of 20 and its rank of sixty-first in 2005 were significantly better than its HDI and GDP per 
capita ranks. 
5
 World Bank 2006, World Development Report: Tables A1 and A2; UNDP 2007/2008: Country Page Egypt. 
6
Carana Corporation, “Special Study: The Results and Impacts of Egypt’s Privatization Program,” Privatization in 
Egypt: Quarterly Review (April-June 2002), pp. 8-11. 
7
HebaNassar, “Temporary and Circular Migration: the Egyptian Case,” Analytic and Synthetic Notes: Circular 
Migration Series (Florence, Italy: European University Institute, Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied 
Research on International Migration, 2008), p. 6; Ragui Assaad, “Labor Supply, Employment, and Unemployment 
in the Egyptian Economy, 1988–2006,” Economic Research Forum, Working Paper Series N. 0701 (Cairo, 2007), 
pp. 1, 12-13. 
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Dilemmas of Privatization   
After decades of delay, privatization in Egypt was accelerated in the second half of the 1990s, as 
119 of 314 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were fully or partially sold.
8
 These firms were mainly 
manufacturing ventures, but the government pledged to expand the privatization program to 
include utilities, public sector banks and insurance companies, leading tourist hotels, and 
maritime and telecommunications firms. In May 1998, the International Monetary Fund, long 
skeptical of the Mubarak regime’s commitment to privatization, pronounced itself satisfied with 
the program’s progress, as measured by the proceeds going into the central Treasury. 
These developments generated controversy over capital ownership and social welfare. 
Between 1992 and 1996, financial markets expanded and trading volume in Egypt’s stock market 
increased ninefold. The number of companies actively traded grew from 111 in 1985 to 354 in 
1996, and the International Finance Corporation listed Egypt in its emerging markets index. 
Assuming that the proponents of privatization had won the day, leftists, workers, and recalcitrant 
state bureaucrats sought to slow the pace of the selloff, while progressives tried to grapple with 
how Egypt’s transition from state to private sector capitalism would evolve. 
How to Privatize?  
There are several methods by which to transfer the ownership of SOEs to the private sector. 
Firms can be sold directly, and in total, to another company for a negotiated price. A second 
                                                 
8
 The discussion of late 1990s privatization below is based on Marsha Pripstein Posusney, “Egyptian Privatization: 
New Challenges for the Left,” Middle East Report 210 (Summer 1999). Unless otherwise noted, information on 
Egyptian privatization from 1996 to 1999 was drawn from al-Ahram Weekly, Middle East Economic Digest and 
Business Monthly. On privatization battles before 1996, see Marsha PripsteinPosusney, Labor and the State in 
Egypt: Workers, Unions, and Economic Restructuring (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 
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option is sale through a competitive bidding process on stock offerings, either to an “anchor 
firm” or “strategic investor” or to the public without granting any single bidder a controlling 
interest. A third method is a voucher program, through which entitlements to purchase shares are 
allocated on an equal basis to all adult citizens, who may then choose either to hold their shares 
or to sell them. Finally, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) allow workers to purchase a 
stake in the firms that employ them. 
Egypt employed a combination of these methods. By July 1998, nine firms had been sold 
to strategic investors, and another 37 had a majority of shares floated on the stock market, while 
19 companies saw 30-40 percent stakes floated. Many of these cases had 5 to 10 percent of their 
sales reserved for employee purchases, with employee shareholder associations (ESAs) set up for 
this purpose; 15 establishments, mostly land reclamation companies, had a full or majority stake 
given to employees. Twenty-five firms were liquidated and their assets sold. 
Typically, neoliberal economists and lending agencies evaluate these methods according 
to their measure of the resulting efficiency and profitability of the firm. The underlying 
assumption—supportable in some but not all cases in Egypt—is that SOEs are inefficiently run, 
with a bloated workforce producing inferior products, all at a cost to the state. In this context, the 
arguments in favor of direct or strategic sales are twofold. First, they result in management by a 
capitalist firm presumably operating according to efficient market principles; and second, the 
anchor should be able to infuse the firm with new capital to modernize equipment and 
production techniques. While some Western economists see value in broader stock distribution, 
on the grounds that spreading property more evenly through the society is more egalitarian and 
enhances popular respect for property rights, the World Bank and the American Chamber of 
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Commerce in Egypt promoted the anchor firm model,
9
 with its tendency to concentrate 
ownership in the hands of established firms. 
Fear of Foreign Hands 
A narrow focus on efficiency criteria ignored fundamental questions about the nationality of 
capital. Given Egypt’s prior experience with colonialism, there was widespread concern about 
turning over the country’s strategic assets to foreign hands. The direct and anchor sale models 
privilege foreign buyers, because Egyptian businessmen generally lacked sufficient capital to bid 
for large purchases, although consortia that pooled local capitalists’ resources were being 
organized. 
Efficiency criteria also obscured concerns about the welfare of workers in privatized 
parastatals. In theory, ESOPs would increase workers’ influence over management decisions, 
thereby leading to more humane working environments, and less resort to layoffs. ESOPs would 
also ensure that capital remains in national hands, and could increase workers’ incomes. Certain 
Islamists advocated giving workers a controlling interest in their firms.
10
 Most labor activists 
interviewed by my colleague Marsha PripsteinPosusney in 1995 saw this as complicity in 
privatization, but a few supported experimentation with ESOPs.  
 Ordinary workers expressed varied responses to these programs, most of which limited 
them to minority ownership. At one large textile factory, workers opposed participation in a 
proposed ESA because it appeared unlikely to empower them to remove corrupt and incompetent 
                                                 
9
 World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 202. 
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 In addition, to the degree that ESOPs benefit only former parastatal workers, 
the new structure would exclude the rest of the citizenry, who were theoretically the collective 
owners of Egypt’s SOEs. 
Domestic or Foreign Capital? 
 
In the 1990s, privatization dramatically increased the presence of foreign capital in Egypt. 
Foreign portfolio investment accounted for about 30 percent of the total market capitalization of 
$20 billion in 1997, with foreign investors owning roughly 20 percent of negotiable shares on the 
exchange. More than 700 foreign institutions and funds were involved in the Egyptian market, 
and several international investment funds were established to concentrate exclusively on 
Egyptian securities. Even government officials expressed fears that a high proportion of foreign 
holdings in the stock market were merely speculative and thus could be injurious to the country’s 
long-term development goals. 
 Anxieties about multinational penetration infused the debate over how the proceeds of 
privatization should be used. Under advice from multilateral lenders, the government dedicated a 
large proportion of the proceeds directly to retiring the public sector debt held by state-owned 
banks, a policy that would make the banks themselves more attractive to buyers. Others argued 
that the proceeds could be better spent helping to modernize and restructure some of the 
remaining SOEs, rendering them more competitive and hence no longer in need of sale. 
 Difficulties arose when foreign purchasers attempted to cooperate with local firms in 
submitting bids. Such a dispute scuttled plans to sell a majority stake in the Ameriyya Cement 
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Samer Shehata, Shopfloor Culture and Politics in Egypt (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2009). 
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Company. France’s Lafarge Coppée was slated to make the purchase with ASEC, an Egyptian 
firm that provides specialized management services to the cement industry, but the deal 
collapsed over ASEC’s objections to Lafarge positioning itself as the lead bidder. As the 
Minister of Industry in the early 1990s, ASEC chairman Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab was seen 
as the cabinet’s most outspoken SOE defender. He resigned in 1993, trailed by rumors that he 




 Albeit using sometimes noxious anti-Semitic language, some opposition parties claimed 
that parastatals would be purchased by Israelis and then deliberately managed to ensure that 
Egypt remained technologically backward. This specter surfaced in a debate over privatizing 
maritime facilities, since the Israeli ambassador had earlier revealed some Israeli companies’ 
interests in purchasing a state-owned stevedoring company. Initially, these concerns led 
‘Atif‘Ubayd, the public enterprise sector minister, to restrict share sales in maritime companies 
to 10percent, but the government subsequently decided to postpone maritime privatization 
altogether. 
 Finally, suspicion of foreign intentions fostered disputes over the pricing of firms to be 
sold. Sharp disagreements between government officials and international consultants hired to 
evaluate the firms delayed the start of the program. Even after intense bidding for some strategic 
sales and oversubscription of some public offerings, some Western economists charged that the 
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The last point was contributed by John Skafianakis. 
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government was demanding unreasonably high prices, while domestic critics accused the 
government of undervaluing Egypt’s assets.13 
 All of this controversy resurrected and refocused historic debates on the relationship 
between class and nation. Was there still an Egyptian “national project” to further industrialize? 
And, if so, could private domestic capitalists realize it better than state managers did? Rather 
than futilely opposing privatization, should leftists support Egyptian capitalists in their struggles 
to limit sales to foreign investors? 
Social Welfare Concerns 
Leftists also opposed privatization because of its potentially deleterious consequences for 
workers’ wellbeing. In “mixed economies” like Egypt prior to liberalization, civil servants and 
public-sector workers enjoyed protection against layoffs, access to pensions and social insurance, 
and even company-provided housing and day care. Along with food subsidies and price controls, 
these protections and benefits constituted a form of welfare. Ostensibly to ease the strain of this 
welfare system on government budgets, privatization typically entailed an end to guaranteed 
employment schemes, and was associated with broader structural adjustment programs that 
subjected basic necessities to market pricing mechanisms. Thus, reforms threatened to remove 
existing social safety nets, usually before establishing alternatives. 
Before a new labor law was passed in Egypt in 2003, which would permit mass layoffs in 
both the public and the private sectors, the government promoted early retirement schemes as a 
means to shrink parastatals’ workforces prior to sale.Egypt’s early retirement program was paid 
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 For more on valuation controversies, see Sophia Anninos, “The Value of Privatization,” paper presented at the 
1998 Middle East Studies Association conference. 
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for by a social development fund financed by foreign donors and privatization proceeds. It 
offered workers an up-front cash payment based on their anticipated salary losses, along with a 
monthly stipend. But the stipend could be less that half the pension the worker would have 
received under the old system. Workers claimed that it was insufficient to meet regular expenses, 
and that their prospects for finding new employment to supplement the stipend were bleak. The 
rationale for the lump sum approach was that recipients could invest in a small business or in 
stocks, and thus foster economic growth. But many were tempted to spend the money on 
essential large-scale expenses, such as their children’s weddings. Those who did so, or whose 
investment schemes failed, would thus face a dismal future. Workers also wondered whether 
their jobs could be saved if the government instead invested the early retirement funds in 
modernizing their factories. 
Reports in 1997 indicated that program enrollment was falling short of government 
targets, and labor activists charged that some workers were pressured into enrolling under threat 
of wage cuts or transfer. The rate of acceptance was rising by 1999, however, as workers 
increasingly feared that once a new labor law was enacted, they would risk being fired with no 
compensation whatsoever in a country that lacks unemployment insurance. 
This controversy raised key questions about Egypt’s “moral economy.” Were jobs a right 
that required the government to be an employer of last resort? Or should the left push for 
Western-style unemployment and welfare systems to protect workers from the ravages of 
capitalist labor markets? In principle, there was no reason for progressives to oppose the 
replacement of universalistic protection schemes with targeted programs—why should 
governments subsidize the well-off? But effective social safety nets require accountable and 
efficient governments. In the 1980s, when the Mubarak regime considered replacing food 
14 
 
subsidies with cash grants and ration cards for the poor, some economists voiced legitimate 
objections that corruption and bureaucratic incompetence would prevent the aid from reaching 
the truly needy. These same problems would confront any program to provide unemployment 
relief. 
Impact of Privatization on Women Workers 
 
The status of women improved significantly under state-led development, albeit from a very low 
base. Female literacy in 2001 was just 45 percent but female gross school enrollment was 72 
percent in that year. Women workers had fared relatively well in the public sector, where there 
was no formal discrimination and no wage disparity by gender, with adequate provisions for 
maternity leave, nursing breaks, on-the-job child care, and equal pay for equal work. With 
structural adjustment and privatization, however, public-sector employment shrank, and social 
pressure against women pursing a career increased, with reports that early retirement schemes in 
the public sector were targeted at women. 
 Furthermore, in the private sector, the alleged engine for future growth, there was a 40 
percent differential between male and female earnings, and private-sector employment was 
becoming defeminized, resulting in higher unemployment rates for females. While more than a 
third of women were in the labor force in 2001 (45 percent of the male rate), the female 





 The result, as Denis shows in Chapter 19 of this volume, was that 
fertility rates rose among stay-at-home wives. 
 
Contesting the Labor Law of 2003 
 Under the labor law that prevailed until 2003, all permanent employees in large 
establishments (those employing a minimum of 50 workers) were entitled to job security and 
social protection.
15
Egyptian labor legislation, dating from the 1950s and 1960s, was extensive.  It 
required formal written employment contracts, guaranteed social insurance to permanent, full-
time workers, and rendered dismissals difficult. Special labor offices were charged with ensuring 
compliance with the law and special labor courts were created to handle disputes. Employees 
received pensions, health and accident insurance, and, in some cases, access to public housing. 
These positions were offered to high school and college graduates as a way to encourage 
education, and came to be viewed by students and their families as an entitlement. 
Laws were more consistently enforced in the public sector than the private sector, 
however. Domestic private firms often found ways to evade the labor laws. The most common 
form of evasion was to force workers to sign undated resignation letters at the time they were 
hired, falsely stating that they had received their severance entitlements. Some business owners 
also bribed labor inspectors to report that owners employed less than 50 employees, thereby 
reducing their mandatory insurance contributions and impeding unionization. Foreign 
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 Marsha Pripstein Posusney  and Melani Cammet, 2004, “Labor Market Flexibilization and Labor 
Standards in the Middle East,” paper presented at conference on “Globalization and Labor in Developing 
Countries,” Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Dec 10-11, 2004  
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 The discussion of changes in Egyptian labor law below is drawn from Karen Pfeifer and Marsha 
Pripstein Posusney, “Arab Economies and Globalization: An Overview,” in Eleanor AbdellaDoumato and 
Marsha Pripstein Posusney, eds.,Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East: Gender, Economy, 
and Society (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 25–54 and Posusney and Cammet 2004. . 
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multinationals, however, were under more scrutiny, as with the public sector. Labor markets 
therefore became segmented between parastatal workers, civil servants, and employees of large 
foreign-owned firms, who enjoyed legal protections, and private sector workers who did not.  
Organized labor, with its core strength in the public sector, had successfully staved off 
several efforts by the regimes of Anwar al-Sadat and Husni Mubarak to liberalize the economy 
and privatize the public sector in the 1970s and 1980s. Egypt’s trade unions finally agreed to 
support the privatization legislation designed by the regime in 1991 (Law 203) with the proviso 
that all firms sold under the auspices of this law continue to abide by existing labor legislation 
and that subsequent sales agreements contain clauses guaranteeing that workforces would not be 
reduced. But economists and the multilateral lenders promoting Egypt’s structural reform 
objected that these restrictions undermined the privatization program, in particular, by making 
public enterprises less desirable for purchase.
16
 
 The government commissioned another body to secretly renegotiate the labor law, 
including representatives of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), business 
organizations, the Ministry of Labor, the legal community, and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). The committee’s progress was slow. The government and private business 
sought to restrict the right to strike, with the former apparently fearing that legalizing any form 
of collective protest could have a snowball effect in a time of generalized political tensions.  
 In essence, the negotiations were a struggle over union power—freedom of association, 
collective bargaining rights, and the right to strike.Union leaders, under the spotlight of the 
opposition press, resisted the retraction of job security or other traditional benefits enjoyed by 
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 Posusney 1997; Marsha Pripstein Posusney 1995,”Egypt’s New Labor Law Removes Worker 
Provisions,” Middle East Report No. 194/5 (May-August 1995): pp. 52-3, 64.  
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public sector workers, but gave ground on legal restrictions on work stoppages. Dissidents in the 
union movement argued that the official union leaders were too close to the government and did 
not represent rank-and-file workers’ concerns, and they opposed the enactment of the 
law.Ironically, then, the main domestic support for the new labor legislation came from the 
ETUF’s leadership, which gained increased power over their workers with its enactment. After 
protracted negotiations, the law was finally passed in 2003.
17
 
 The 2003 labor law was designed to make labor markets more flexible, an institutional 
change to accompany liberalization and privatization. It aimed to give employers far greater 
leeway in hiring and firing, changing job assignments, using “temporary” labor, and downsizing 
the workforce according to “economic conditions.” It gave managers greater authority to set 
lower wages and reduced benefits for new hires, and it revoked the annual cost of living 
adjustment to the national minimum wage. It also made it more difficult for a worker to win an 
appeal of a termination and more costly in terms of wages foregone.
18
 
 The new legislation permitted multiple renewals of temporary work contracts, making it 
unlikely that any temporary worker could achieve the security of permanent status, or that any 
new worker would be rehired indefinitely. While retaining the requirement that firms obtain 
government approval for any mass workforce reductions, it signaled a sea change by stating 
explicitly that employers have the right to downsize, lower the contractual wage, and/or require 
employees to perform different jobs than they were hired for, for economic reasons. A 
“grandfather clause” exempted current permanent workers from application of these provisions, 
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 Marsha Pripstein Posusney 2007, “Free Trade and Freer Unions? Globalization and Labor Market 
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but workers who lost jobs due to privatization, and then find new employment, would lose this 
protection. This clause apparently contributed to the cabinet’s reluctance to move the legislation 
until companies with excess workers had already been rationalized.
19
Finally, in an explicit quid 
pro quo for the “right to fire,” the law recognized labor’s right to strike for the first time since 
1952, but only under restrictive and tightly controlled conditions.  
 
 
The Roaring 2000s 
Privatization enthusiasts cheered to see stock market capitalization rise from 35.6 to 105 
percent of GDP from 1985 to 2004, but the sobering reality was that the share of the formal 
private sector in GDP actually decreased between 2000 and 2007, from 70.7 to 62.3 percent, and 
that private ownership became more concentrated as the number of companies listed and traded 
on the stock exchange decreased by more than 50 percent from its peak of 1,151 firms in 2002 to 
435 in 2007.
20
 However, the new wave of reforms was credited with a surge of economic growth 
from 2004 to 2008, as see in Figure 2 below. 
[Figure 17.2 GDP Growth, here] 
 
The ballyhooed round of additional liberalizing reforms under Prime Minister Ahmad 
Nazif in 2004 was widely praised by the international business community and the World Bank 
and IMF as a breakthrough in business-friendly policies. These reforms included the lowering of 
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inflation, taxes, and tariffs and the streamlining of documentation needed to import and export, 
to register property and start up new businesses, and to access credit for investment.  
Long-established businesses were also well placed to benefit from the reforms. As the 
director of an international automaker producing in Egypt for the Egyptian market told the author 
in November 2006, “It used to take us days to register an incoming shipment of parts, and now it 
takes us hours. Nazif’s reforms have made our day to day operations simpler and more efficient 
and changed the environment to give hope to what could become a thriving private sector in 
Egypt.” This company had accordingly expanded its importing of cars and shifted its emphasis in 
production toward light trucks for sale in the Egyptian market. Its partner in the importing and 
distribution divisions was none other than the minister of transportation in the Nazif cabinet. 
Egypt had liberalized foreign access to almost all sectors of the economy, but with 
minimal impact on diversification of formal economic activity. The stock of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Egypt rose slowly in the 1990s and early 2000s but was concentrated in the 
capital-intensive hydrocarbon industry, with US-based oil corporations accounting for three 
fourths of that stock.
21
 Indeed, the energy sector remained the chief draw, with more than half of 
FDI going into hydrocarbons and related industries in the 2000s. As reserves of oil were fast 
dwindling but new reserves of gas were being discovered, the growth industries in this sector are 
natural gas extraction, oil refining and natural gas liquefaction, petrochemicals, and the building 
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of infrastructure for Egypt to broaden its role as a major transmission station for the export of oil 
and gas from the region to Europe.
22
 
Thanks to the 2003 change in labor law and the 2004 reforms, Egypt became the object 
of an unprecedented, but short-lived, wave of foreign direct investment from the world at large 
and from the Arab Gulfcountries. As shown in Figure 3 below, FDI from all sources rose by a 
dizzying factor of 26 in just a few years, from $450 million in 2003 to a peak of $11.6 billion in 
2007. Egypt was one of the top three Mediterranean-country recipients of FDI in 2000-2008, 
taking 15 percent of total FDI to the MED-13 [southern and eastern Mediterranean countries] in 
those years.
23
 From 2005 to 2007, FDI to Egypt averaged 15 percent of GDP, or 200 Euros per 
capita.
24
 Foreign participation in Egypt’s stock market reached its apogee in 2007, at 31 percent 
of total trading volume.
25
 
[Figure 17.3, Remittances, Tourism Revenues, and Foreign Direct Investment, here] 
 
 On the intraregional level, Egypt received 7.5 percent of inter-Arab FDI from 2005 to 
2009, the fourth largest recipient among Arab countries, and, startlingly, Egyptian firms were 
                                                 
22
 For a full discussion of Egypt’s role in the oil and natural gas industries, see Anthony H. Cordesman 
and Khalid R. Al-Khodan, The Changing Dynamics of Energy in the Middle East (Washington, DC: 
Center for International and Strategic Studies, 2006). 
23
Ashraf Mishrif 2010, Investing in the Middle East: the Political Economy of European Direct 
Investment in Egypt. London: I.B. Tauris: p. 135.  
24
 Pierre Henry, Samir Abdelkrim and Bénédict de Saint-Laurent, 2008. Foreign Direct Investment into 
MEDA in 2007: the Switch. Study No. 1, July 2008. NP: ANIMA – MIPO Observatory: ANIMA 
Investment Network.: 13 
25





even the source of 10.4 percent of inter-Arab investment in 2008, the third largest after the 
United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.
26
 
According to one enthusiastic observer writing before the financial crisis of 2008 hit, 
Egypt was “the most integrated with the Gulf Cooperation Council investment program,” 
receiving about 40 percent of the Arab Gulf states’FDI in the Mediterranean from 2003 to 2007, 
about $3.3 billion at its peak in fiscal year 2006-2007.During that year, Egypt also received $1 
billion in remittances from the Gulf states alone, and Egypt’s exports to the Gulf states were 
close to $550 million, including iron and steel, which made up 30 percent of Egypt’s non-
hydrocarbon exports.
27
 Observers also applauded the Gulf states’ FDI in infrastructure as well as 
“manufacturing, organic farming, IGT, financial services, and logistics.”28 
During 2000 to 2007, half of the incoming FDI to Egypt from the Gulf stateswent for 
acquisitions of existing firms rather than new projects. For example, in 2007 LaFarge of France 
contracted to purchase Orascom Construction, an Egyptian corporation that was listed as one of 
the top 100 non-financial transnational corporations (TNCs) from developing countries by 
UNCTAD in 2006. Some acquisitions entailed purchases of privatized public-sector enterprises, 
such as the 2007 takeover of the Egyptian Fertilizers Company by a company from the UAE. 
Other acquisitions were purely financial. For example, while Kuwait’s stock of investment in 
Egypt stood at $25 billion in early 2009, mostly in real estate, two of Kuwait’s biggest 
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investments in 2007 had been the acquisition by the (private) National Bank of Kuwait of one of 
Egypt’s most successful private banks, Al Watany Bank, and the purchase by the Global 
Investment House, a private equity firm, of a significant stake in the private brokerage firm, 
Capital Trust, of Egypt.
29
 
Crash, Recession and Recovery 
 Liberalization and privatization had clearly left Egypt vulnerable to the ravages of the 
global financial crisis and subsequent recession that swept the world economy in 2008-2009.  
But Egypt’s economy turned out to be more resilient than expected, with growth declining to 
“just” 4.7 percent in 2009, as indicated in Figure 17. 2. 
Even before the financial crisis in 2008, the wave of FDI to Egypt had begun to ebb, 
decreasing by 18 percent from $11.6 billion in 2007 to about $9.5 billion in 2008.
30
The 
downdraft continued in 2009, at $6.7 billion, and 2010, at an estimated $6.5 billion.
31
The 
distribution of FDI still favored hydrocarbons, which accounted for 57 percent of FDI in 2008, 
while finance received 9 percent and real estate and construction 8 percent. Non-hydrocarbon-
related industry received 17 percent and services took about 10 percent, but agriculture received 
2 percent and ICT less than one percent. Of these amounts, new projects and expansions of 
existing companies accounted for almost one third, while privatization proceeds were about 9 
percent. Contrary to the impression given by some observers, over two thirds of Egypt’s FDI in 
2008 came from the West, with 33 percent from the United States and 36 percent from the 
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 The capital market also decreased in value. From its peak in the spring of 2008 to 
November, Egypt’s bourse index dropped 54 percent.33 Similarly, Egypt’s stock market 
capitalization had peaked at 85.8 percent of GDP in 2007, then declined by half to 41.4 percent 
in 2009, and foreign participation fell to 19 percent of total trading value.
34
 Portfolio flows had 
already begun to shrink before the global financial crisis took shape. Egypt had experienced a 
rush of speculative inflows in the boom years of 2005 and 2006, following liberalization of 
capital markets in 2004. With the slowing of the boom and of foreign investment of all kinds in 
2007, however, those speculative flows reversed themselves, creating net outflows of about 3 
percent and 7 percent, respectively, in 2007 and 2008.
35
 
There was a shift in the number and nationality of companies listed on Arab stock 
markets. While Saudi Arabia and Jordan added companies to their exchanges between 2007 and 
2009, Egypt’s listings declined from 435 firms in 2007 to 306 firms in 2009. This drop was 
likely due to a wave of privatizations of public-sector companies and a strong bout of mergers 
and acquisitions by Gulf country firms. Egypt, on the other hand, was the main seller, with the 
value of its sales leaping from $1.7 billion in 2007 to $15.9 billion in 2008.
36
 The fact that 30 
                                                 
32
 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) 
 2009. Foreign Direct Investment Report. NY: United Nations.: 8-9 ] 
33
 World Bank 2009, Global Economic Prospects. Washington DC: World Bank: 161 
34




 Sturm, Michael and Nicolas Sauter 2010. “The Impact of the Global Financial Turmoil and Recession on 
Mediterranean Countries’ Economies,” Frankfurt, Germany: European Central Bank. Occasional Paper Series, No. 
118, August 2010: 12 
36
Dhaman 2010: 13, Table 8, Table 10; 2009: Table 8, Table 10 
24 
 
percent of Egyptian firms disappeared from the stock market from 2007 to 2009 suggests that 
privatization and mergers and acquisitions may have dampened competition and productive 
activity rather than stimulated it. 
Egypt’s non-financial sectors and overall growth were not much affected by the financial 
crisis but, rather, were shocked by the subsequent recession in Europe and the United States. In 
2009, exports decreased 25 percent, Suez Canal fees dropped by over seven percent, and both 
fixed investment and remittances declined by 10 percent, while tourism declined only slightly. 
As indicated in Figure 17.2, aggregate growth declined from the 7 percent rate in 2007 and 2008 
to about 4.7 percent in 2009. The IFIs had predicted that it would be much worse, but this rate 
was still high enough that per capita income did not fall, and unemployment increased by one 
percentage point, from 8.4 percent in 2008 to 9.4 percent in 2009. What cushioned the blows 
were Egypt’s own peculiar strengths: its domestic informal economy, in which production and 
demand continued to grow, the quick restoration of remittances and tourism revenues, and a 
government stimulus package of new investment in infrastructure. FDI, in contrast, was of little 
help. As shown in Figure 3, it decreased by almost 50 percent between its peak in 2007 and the 
recession of 2009, and did not recover in 2010. 
 
What Economic Program for the Arab Summer and Beyond? 
 
Before the January 25 uprising, most observers expected Egypt to continue liberalizing 
and privatizing and globalizing. Egypt was named as a member of the next round of “emerging 
markets” by the Economist Intelligence Unit, and listed by Goldman Sachs among the “Next 11” 




37Following India’s model, Egypt developed an apparently successful set of 
enterprise zones for Internet technology and business process outsourcing, taking advantage of 
the language skills of its educated population and its proximity to Europe. This sector attracted 
investment from Microsoft and Vodafone in 2010.
38
 Growth in the developing economies of the 
Middle East was predicted to return to its long-term trend in 2010 to 2012. Egypt, like Turkey, 
faced good prospects in 2010, having shown that the decline of the vaunted Gulf FDI had not had 
much of an impact. The major weakness in this picture was the affront to the dignity of the 
Egyptian people from the high level of corruption and cronyism that this course of liberalized 
development had entailed so far, and the inequitable distribution of its benefits. 
 
What Economic Program for the Arab Summer and Beyond? 
 The changes in economic policy already wrought by the “Arab spring” in 2011 and the 
likely changes ahead will entail neither a total retreat from a market economy nor a plunge back 
into full central planning. Rather, to tackle the insulting and embarrassing excesses of 
liberalization and privatization, and to broaden the benefits of economic growth, the government 
will subject the market system to greater regulation and supervision, and will give more attention 
to provision of social goods and reduction in income inequality. As one Egyptian economist 
noted, “You have to consider that privatization is not only an economic issue; it is also a political 
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issue that has altered the distribution of wealth and power within the society. It also has 
generated considerable corruption.”39 
 To prove its revolutionary mettle in the spring of 2011, the Egyptian investment authority 
overturned agreements for several direct investments, land sales, and foreign loans. In a dramatic 
gesture, it reneged on a deal made in 2006 for the purchase of Egypt’s famous Omar Effendi 
department store by Amwal al-Khaleej, a Saudi-owned investment conglomerate. Equally 
dramatic, and despite the IMF’s claim to promote “socially inclusive growth” in the aid and loan 
packages it organized for Egypt and Tunisia this spring, in June 2011 the government of Egypt 
revoked its earlier acceptance of an IMF loan worth $3 billion.
40
On August 1, the government 
announced that it was canceling the privatization program for the foreseeable future. The 
challenge, however, is to determine a coherent and sustainable alternative program to put in its 
place. 
 
Author’s note:This chapter draws on joint publications by Marsha Pripstein Posusney (1951- 
2008) and Karen Pfeifer, and from published and unpublished manuscripts written separately by 
the two authors and collated by Pfeifer for this volume. 
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